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The negotiations with Greece have been a telling reminder of the weaknesses of 
the euro area. If the monetary union is going to be stable in the long term, some 
important elements will have to be changed. Yet there is little agreement on the 
details, particularly on further steps to integrate fiscal policies. A fiscal union can 
create stability only if it includes both credible budget rules and some kind of risk 
sharing. It is an important way of stabilizing the euro area, but not a universal 
remedy. A structured process is now needed to put together a reform package and 
to overcome mistrust between the euro members.
A European Fiscal Union –  
What Is It About?
The idea of a European fiscal union is not new, 
and in fact was propounded as early as 1977 in 
the MacDougall Report. At the time the issue was 
a larger common EU budget, which was seen to 
be a precondition for more monetary integration. 
The current proposals for a fiscal union aimed at 
coordinating or communitarizing additional com-
petences in the euro area cover a broader spectrum. 
Two basic strands can be discerned in the debate.
Sharing sovereignty. On the one hand there are 
those who advocate a fiscal union built on the idea 
of shared sovereignty. They demand better super-
vision of national budgetary policy, more inter-
vention powers for the EU institutions, and greater 
incentives for more discipline in the area of public 
finance. These objectives are mirrored for example 
in the proposals submitted by  German finance 
minister Wolfgang Schäuble and by Jean-Claude 
Trichet, the former president of the European 
Central Bank (ECB), who have come out in favour 
of a European Commissioner or Minister with 
veto power over national budgets. The most 
important tasks of such a person would be to 
supervise the budgetary policy of each and every 
euro member, and to impose punitive sanctions 
even against outright resistance by national gov-
ernments. Similarly, proposals by Germany’s 
Bundesbank to establish a European Fiscal Council, 
which would pass budgetary assessments inde-
pendent of political considerations, add up to a 





























understanding from them. However, more strin- 
gent budgetary supervision alone cannot create 
sufficient stability for the euro area.
Imperfect enforcement. First, there are well-
founded doubts about whether the rules can ever 
be implemented to the extent envisaged by this 
approach. The Stability and Growth Pact has been 
broken on numerous occasions, and it is surely no 
accident that sanctions were not imposed, even 
though it would have been perfectly possible to 
do so. As long as ECOFIN or the Eurogroup are 
responsible for such decisions, there is always the 
danger of mutual forbearance among the member 
states. This would not change even if there were 
such a thing as a more stringent European super-
visory and sanctions regime with veto power. 
However, if the Commission was granted powers 
which make mutual forbearance a thing of the 
past and effectively curtail budgetary sovereignty, 
there would be a need for greater democratic 
legitimacy on the European level. Both in Greece 
and Italy today, and in Germany and France in 
the 2000s, the current amount of supervision has 
provoked a great deal of opposition. Moreover, 
tightening up the budgetary rules would make it 
harder to coordinate a common fiscal stance of 
the euro area, since deficits would be limited, but 
surpluses would not. 
Systemic risks. Second, an approach that limits 
further integration to more stringent budgetary 
supervision assumes – either tacitly or openly – 
that the euro area is no more than the sum of its 
parts. That is not the case. Eighteen euro coun-
tries with stable government debt ratios do not 
necessarily constitute a stable monetary union. A 
country without a monetary policy of its own is 
limited in its ability to react to crises, since the 
decisions of the ECB take into account only the 
overall situation in the euro area. Especially the 
smaller euro countries are solely dependent on 
their own fiscal policy in times of crisis. But at the 
same time they are subjected to far greater shocks 
than they would experience without monetary 
union. The highly integrated European financial 
system can lead to a great deal of turmoil, as Ire-
land and Spain found out to their cost. The fact 
that these countries had adhered to the European 
budgetary rules and were able to point to very low 
levels of debt turned out to be of little importance 
in the crisis. The ECB was unable to react to the 
These proposals are all based on the assumption 
that the crisis was caused by the irresponsible 
expenditure policy of individual countries, and 
that the strategy of allowing the member states of 
Europe’s monetary union to retain most of their 
fiscal policy sovereignty has been a failure. Con-
fidence in the efficacy of the current European 
fiscal rules – and first and foremost in the Stability 
and Growth Pact – is low. 
Shared Risk. On the other hand there are the pro-
ponents of a fiscal union who put the emphasis on 
risk sharing. They believe that the crisis has proven 
that country-specific shocks – no matter whether 
they are external or home-made – can lead to con-
tagion and ultimately cast doubt on the stability of 
the monetary union as a whole. A fiscal union in 
this context means creating a system of mutual 
support, which makes it possible to share risks 
within the monetary union that the members can 
(no longer) shoulder on their own. With such a 
system in place, so the thinking goes, crises 
would occur less frequently in future and the 
members of the euro area would be less suscepti-
ble to systemic “spillover” effects. The specific 
proposals for greater risk sharing range from an 
anti-cyclical shock absorption mechanism based 
on “output gaps” via a common European unem-
ployment insurance system to the issuance of 
common debt obligations.
More Stringent Budgetary Supervision 
Is Not Enough
Many measures designed to stabilize the euro area 
have been initiated since the outbreak of the crisis. 
However, the reforms of the fiscal framework that 
have been implemented so far have been largely 
concerned with sharing of sovereignty. The Fiscal 
Compact and the “six-pack” and “two-pack” leg-
islation are designed to supervise the budgets of 
the euro member in a more comprehensive manner 
and to reduce deficits by threatening to im pose 
more credible sanctions.
More stringent budgetary rules can help to stabilize 
a currency union. A country with low levels of debt 
has more room for manoeuvre with regard to 
anti-cyclical policies in the event of a crisis. It can 
increase expenditures and thus bolster internal 
demand. Furthermore, if it had to be rescued by 
fellow euro area members, it could expect more 
3specific problems by way of monetary easing, and 
it was unable to calm down the markets by acting 
as a lender of last resort. The harsh austerity 
measures that had to be adopted as a result of this 
had a pronounced pro-cyclical effect and contrib-
uted to the “self-fulfilling insolvency” phenom-
enon. Suspicions about whether or not a state was 
solvent weakened its actual solvency on account 
of higher interest rates on government debt. Thus 
the fiscal union can be an effective way of stabi-
lizing the euro area only if it also includes some 
kind of risk sharing.
Risk Sharing to Complement 
Budgetary Rules
A fiscal union which not only punishes deviation 
from the rules but also includes mechanisms has 
three distinct advantages.
Insurance effect. Euro countries face the problem 
that they borrow in a currency that they do not 
directly control. Risk sharing by way of issuing a 
limited number of common debt obligations would 
make it possible to absorb sudden changes in mar-
ket risk perceptions, and would protect states 
against self-reinforcing effects. There are fears 
that this might encourage states to take on exces-
sive amounts of debt, and they are certainly 
justified. For this reason it is important to see com-
mon bonds as a complement to and not as an 
antithesis of more stringent budgetary supervi-
sion. Furthermore, the precise institutional 
design can be an effective way of dealing with 
misplaced incentives. A precondition is that a 
state guilty of misuse can be denied further sup-
port in some credible kind of way.
Resilient financial system. If euro members were 
to finance themselves partly (though not com-
pletely) via common bonds, banks would have a 
sufficient supply of safe assets which do not depend 
on the solvency of a single vulnerable state. This 
would not weaken the disciplining effect of the 
markets on government expenditure. In point of 
fact market discipline would only now start to be 
effective. State insolvency would become a credi-
ble option, since it would no longer lead to the col-
lapse of the entire national financial system and 
thus to politically and socially unacceptable costs.
Smaller imbalances. The ECB’s single monetary 
policy, which is based on averages, can fit the 
needs of the euro countries only if their economic 
cycles are more or less in sync. If this is not the 
case, interest rates are too low for rapidly growing 
Source: Authors’ compilation






























































States, which is often cited as the model of a 
functioning monetary union, reveals that risks 
are shared not only via fiscal policy, but also via 
the credit and financial markets. Capital invested 
across state borders ensures that financial shocks 
and the ensuing profits and losses are distributed 
over the whole of the monetary area, even if ini-
tially they impact only one part of it. In the euro 
area the brunt of a shock is often borne by a single 
country. For this reason a greater cross-owner-
ship of assets in Europe is desirable.
Completing banking union. To prevent such finan-
cial integration from generating panic in the next 
economic downturn, it is also important to 
assume joint responsibility for the system. The 
creation of a (still incomplete) banking union 
with a single supervisor and resolution mecha-
nism is an important step in the right direction. 
However, what is still missing is the certainty that 
a national crisis will not lead to exclusion from the 
monetary union. For example, the State of California 
has been on the brink of insolvency on several 
occasions. Nevertheless there was no reason to 
think that it would leave the dollar area. Conse-
quently, there was no exchange rate risk. Inves-
tors and citizens assess the situation in the euro 
area differently, as the huge capital outflows from 
Spain or more recently Greece have shown. Only a 
credible commitment to the irreversibility of the 
common currency, for example, in the shape of a 
common deposit guarantee scheme, can prevent 
the kind of capital flight that is bound to reinforce 
the crisis.
No fiscal union without convergence. Last but not 
least, the move to more risk sharing must be ac-
companied by a structural convergence of the 
European economies. This will contribute to the 
completion of the single market and thus provide 
support for the synchronization of business cycles 
through classical market mechanisms. There is 
an opportunity for interlinkage which has been 
re cognized in the recently published “Five Presi-
dents’ Report.” The prospect of a stabilization 
mechanism can be an incentive for those coun-
tries in the euro area which would otherwise be 
either unable or unwilling to work towards greater 
convergence. At the same time, it would also 
generate more political support in countries 
which are afraid to be disadvantaged by a stabili-
zation mechanism. 
countries with high inflation, and too high for 
countries with low growth and inflation (“one 
size fits none”). For this reason interest rates tend 
to exacerbate divergent trends which ultimately 
translate into different levels of competitiveness. 
In theory this could be resolved by a discretionary 
coordination of fiscal policies. However, in prac-
tice this is well-nigh impossible on the interna-
tional level. In this context automatic stabilizers 
may perhaps be the solution. There are several 
options available, such as a common unemploy-
ment insurance system or a stabilization mecha-
nism based on output gap measurements. They 
all have in common that they redistribute money 
from booming countries to those languishing in a 
cyclical recession. Thus they can help ensure that 
monetary policy fits the needs of euro area mem-
ber states. Such mechanisms should not be con-
fused with instruments designed to foster real 
convergence in living standards. They do not equa- 
lize structural differences and for this reason do 
not necessarily lead to long-term net transfer 
payments. 
Beyond Fiscal Union
Additional private risk sharing. The proposed 
mechanisms for sharing fiscal risks are not a uni-
versal remedy. Risk sharing should also be a fea-

























5To summarize, a fiscal union is no more than a 
building block for the stabilization of the mone-
tary union, albeit an important one. A combina-
tion of sovereignty sharing and risk sharing would 
provide a sound foundation on which other areas 
of the European Economic and Monetary Union – 
including the market-based ones – can function 
and withstand crises in the future. There may well 
be distributional effects from a fiscal union, but 
the cost is likely to be much lower than that of 
ongoing instability in the euro area.
The Five Presidents’ Report –  
Starting Point for a Reform Package
It will not be easy to reach political agreement on 
greater fiscal policy integration. Currently only a 
handful of euro countries seem to be interested in 
concrete reforms, even if there is a fundamental – 
albeit vague – understanding that they are neces-
sary. Giving up decision-making powers in the 
area of budgetary policy will come up against a 
great deal of opposition even in countries such as 
Germany which are officially in favour of the 
move. Furthermore, the proponents of a fiscal union, 
as we have seen, are split into two camps, which 
at times are very suspicious of each other. They 
have different perceptions of the central problem 
and different political preferences for the future 
of the euro area. And, last but not least, the trans-
fer of additional budgetary competences to the 
European level, which would become necessary 
when building a fiscal union, will most likely make 
it necessary to amend the European treaties.
The status quo is not a viable option. Should 
Europe wait and insist on adherence to the exist-
ing rules until the member states have once again 
developed mutual trust and respect? This path 
sounds promising only at first sight. In fact, the 
alternative to a substantial reform of the euro 
area is not the continuation of a more or less 
stable status quo, but the regular recurrence of 
crises. Under the current framework conditions 
imbalances are part of the common currency. If 
the euro area proves unable to deal with crises 
through democratically sanctioned instruments, 
the course of action will be dictated by the require-
ments of monetary policy. The ECB has in the past 
– though in an implicit manner – implemented 
both sovereignty sharing and risk sharing in order 
to preserve its ability to manage monetary policy. 
The OMT (“outright monetary transactions”) pro-
gramme is an example of the former, and macro-
economic conditionality in the case of ELA loans 
(“emergency liquidity assistance”) for states such 
as Ireland is an example of the latter. This situ-
ation is neither desirable for the ECB nor for the 
member states. However, it is the logical outcome 
of an incomplete monetary union.
Thus two areas of controversy can be discerned in 
the current reform debate. First, the fiscal union 
can be an effective way of strengthening the euro 
area, though it should not be the only one. Second, 
all attempts at reform will come up against robust 
political opposition, but doing nothing is not a 
viable option. It follows that a structured reform 
process is urgently needed in order to assemble a 
comprehensive package and overcome mistrust 
between the member states.
Reform as a package. Currently the preconditions 
for such a process are rather favourable. In the wake 
of the showdown over Greece policy-makers have 
started again to set their sights on the euro area’s 
future. There is certainly no dearth of proposals. 
In June 2015 Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of 
the European Commission, presented the Five 
Presidents’ Report, which he coordinated. It 
shows how steps leading to reform can interact 
and interlock. German, Italian and French ideas 
on a possible European minister of finance were 
made public during the summer recess. Emma-
nuel Macron, the French economy minister, has 
issued a call for “refounding Europe”. This would 
include a “full” fiscal union with permanent fiscal 
transfers and a European finance minister. One 
does not have to agree with all of Mr. Macron’s 
proposals. However, the members of the euro 
area should now use the opportunities presented 
by the reform process that has been initiated by 
the Five Presidents’ Report in order to come out 
of the defensive. The guiding question should no 
longer be “What do we want to prevent?” It ought 
to be “What do we want to achieve and what can 
we do to get it?” As far as France is concerned this 
will mean fleshing out the recent proposals. And 
for Germany, it will mean specifying how much 
sovereignty sharing and economic convergence 
would be needed in order to agree to a greater 
degree of risk sharing in the monetary union. 
6This publication is part of “Repair and Prepare: 
Strengthen the euro”, a larger research project of 
the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Jacques Delors 
Institut – Berlin, www.strengthentheeuro.eu.
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